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
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
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# *Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000*



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**Volume VI**

**East Asia and the Western Pacific Basin**

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The Department of the Army  
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF  
OPERATIONS AND PLANS  
LONG-RANGE PLANNING GROUP

The views, opinions, and findings contained in this report are those of the authors and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy, or decision unless so designated by other official documentation.

STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ARMY  
TO THE YEAR 2000

East Asia and the Western Pacific Basin

Georgetown University  
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## Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
INTRODUCTION	1
ASSUMPTIONS	4
UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN THE REGION	5
REGIONAL ANALYSIS	7
Japan	9
North and South Korea	12
China (PRC)	22
Taiwan	27
The Philippines	29
Island States and Dependencies	31
Malaysia	32
Singapore	33
Indonesia	34
Kampuchea and Vietnam	35
Thailand	38
Australia - New Zealand	39
REGIONAL DETERMINANTS AND POSSIBLE FUTURES	40
Scenario 1 (greater stability)	45
Scenario 2 (less stability)	47
Scenario 3 (Moscow's best case)	49

## STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS

American Moods	51
Will U.S. Interests Change?	54
Probable Missions	56
Manpower Needs and Forces Available	61
Technical Considerations	67
Force Employment Characteristics	70
Mobilization	73
Force Mobility	74
Employment in a Wide Spectrum of conflicts	76
Overflight Rights and Forward Basing	79
Prepositioning	81
Force Design	82

## STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS FOR THE ARMY

83

## NOTES

91

## BIBLIOGRAPHY


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## East Asia and the Western Pacific Basin



## INTRODUCTION

East Asia and the Western Pacific basin comprise that quarter of the globe lying between 100 degrees E and 160 degrees E (the International Date Line). East Asia is usually thought of as the 13 nation states from North Korea to Indonesia and west to Thailand, but it is ethnically and geographically reasonable to include the trans-Ural U.S.S.R. and "autonomous" Mongolia as well. Since some American island dependencies (e.g., Palau) actually lie west of Tokyo, one might even consider the U.S. to be an East Asian power. The Western Pacific basin includes all of Oceania west of Hawaii, and Australia and New Zealand.

Aside from several Pacific Island groups, there are only two European colonies left in the region -- Hong Kong and Macau. Most of the former will probably come under PRC control in 1997. Macau is only theoretically Portuguese; in practice it is run by local Chinese under strong PRC influence.

The region is important to us for a variety of reasons. Geographically, it dominates our Western approaches and straddles the maritime access to the Indian Ocean from the east. It is the only region where the U.S.S.R. and United States abut (in the Beiring Strait). Politically, it is the locus of China, the world's most populous country, a leader of the Third World, and the principal restraining influence on Soviet imperialism in Asia. It is the scene of our two most recent major wars -- Korea and Vietnam -- neither of which resolved their underlying causes. We have five military allies in the region and have a military assistance relationship of some kind with four others. Economically, it is a rich source of vital raw materials,

notably non-ferrous metals and petroleum. American fixed investment in the region is substantial, probably in excess of \$20 billion, and rising. Japan is one of our most important trading partners and China may, in the fallness of time, become another.

The heterogeneity of the region is almost beyond comprehension, with great extremes of size, prosperity, language, ethnic origin, climate, topography, and political orientation. Many of these extremes exist side-by-side within national boundaries. This heterogeneity, along with severe population/resource imbalances in some countries, produces friction that can, and often does, explode into violence. North of the Tropic of Capricorn there is not one country that is genuinely at ease with its neighbors. Only two friendly countries in the area, Australia and New Zealand, are truly committed to each other in a military alliance. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has a peripheral military dimension, but falls far short of mutual military interdependence.

As far as the U.S. military presence is concerned, the region is basically Air Force and Navy country. Except for Korea and Thailand, there are no friendly locations where ground troops can be placed in direct confrontation with a potential adversary, and our departure from Thailand appears irreversible in this century. Of the 125,000 U.S. military personnel in the region, only 31,500 are Army and 29,000 of them are in South Korea. There is a potential Army role in Southeast Asia, but as of now no forward-based units to address it.

To chart an optimum U.S. Army strategy for East Asia and the Western Pacific out to the year 2000, we must postulate some assumptions about the politico-economic environment which will prevail, identify our vital and important interests in the region and the friendly forces currently in place to defend them, and cull from the geographic and functional papers in this study a blend of Army force and doctrine which, within projected political and fiscal restraints, will permit the Army to play an appropriate role in peace-keeping and war-fighting in the region.

## ASSUMPTIONS

- o Pressures of population growth will trigger internal instability and periodic international conflict throughout the region

- o Deteriorating population/resource ratios will feed this instability and conflict

- o Expanded education, coupled with declining employment opportunity, will foster articulate discontent

- o Existing religious and ethnic tensions within many of the tropic zone countries will be exacerbated by economic deprivation

- o Some countries will experience leadership succession crises, which will tempt external adventurism.

- o The plethora of unresolved territorial claims in the area will remain a serious potential source of conflict, particularly where valuable resources are involved.

- o The People's Republic of China has a strong self-interest in keeping the peace and containing Soviet imperialism in East Asia.

- o Friendly indigenous forces will remain capable of containing most low intensity interval violence.

- o The ideological competition between Marxism and Capitalism will continue in the area, and may spread to some countries hitherto unaffected.

## UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN THE REGION

There has been, a consensus among the governments and people of the United States that the peace, stability and non-hostile orientation of East Asia are crucial to the national security and economic well-being of the United States, and that the maintenance of these conditions can only be assured by a strong U.S. military, political and economic presence in the region. Such a presence, in turn, requires an array of mutual security and economic assistance agreements with our allies and friends in the area, entailing a substantial commitment of U.S. military and economic resources to our partners in return for their cooperation in providing military basing privileges, freedom of movement, and access to resources and markets.

In that context, the following facilities and conditions are regarded as vital to a secure U.S. presence in the region and thus to the protection of our fundamental national interests:

- o The preservation of our existing military base structure in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and certain U.S. and foreign-controlled Pacific Islands, along with the freedom to modify that structure to meet new exigencies.

- o Free U.S. and allied accessibility to vital air routes and sea lanes in the Western Pacific region.

- o Reliable access for the United States and its friends and allies in East Asia to the region's existing and potential mineral resources.

The following facilities and conditions in the region are regarded as important to U.S. interests:

- o The maintenance of a stable political and military environment.

- o The prevention of Soviet or other Communist dominance in the region.

- o The strengthening of U.S. military influence and capabilities.

- o Closer cooperation and coordination with, and among, our allies.

- o Active support from China and Japan for U.S. interests.

- o Maintenance of at least the present status quo in Korea.

- o Maintenance of effective resistance on the part of the more vulnerable countries in the region to Soviet/Vietnamese threats and blandishments.

- o The pursuance of policies and (conduct by the governments of the region) which are conducive to internal tranquility and constructive intercourse with friendly foreign countries.

## REGIONAL ANALYSIS

East Asia and the Western Pacific Basin area cannot be meaningfully analyzed as an entity. It is by far the most heterogeneous of the five regions covered in this study. There is almost nothing worth saying about any one country in the region which could be confidently applied to one other, let alone all the others. Collectively, the states in the area and the various Pacific island dependencies encompass the full spectra of size, population, ideology, and per capita GNP.

It is even more difficult, and on the whole unrewarding, to analyze them in groups, whether ideological or geographic. Japan and Fiji are both democracies, but have little else in common. Most of the logical geographic groupings contain countries actually or technically at war with each other.

What can be said about the region as a whole is that a significant conflict anywhere within it will have at least a measurable impact, either military or economic, on virtually all of the states in the area, and thus all have a stake - for better or worse - in regional peace. It is also useful to recognize the region-wide influence of two dominant countries - China and Japan. China is important because of its central location, its immense human and natural resources, and its status as cultural homeland for the millions of ethnic Chinese who pull sensitive political and economic strings throughout the region; Japan because it dominates the region's economy, both as supplier and market.

Having posed these generalities, we will examine each individual friendly country in turn, working roughly north to



south, to see how each fits into the broader matrix of future war or peace in the region and how each can serve (or frustrate) U.S. and Army strategy to keep the peace. However, since our Task 3 paper on East Asia and the Western Pacific Basin identifies the four most threatening potential areas of conflict in the region as 1) the Korean Peninsula, 2) Southeast Asia, 3) China/Taiwan, and 4) PRC/USSR, we will focus this summary analysis primarily on those countries most likely to be involved in one or more of these conflicts, either as participants or as staging areas for possible U.S. peacekeeping operations. The first three of these potential conflicts could, if they got out of hand, impel the forward deployment of U.S. Army assets; but renewed active warfare in the Korean theater would almost certainly engage Army elements on Day 1. We will therefore dwell most heavily on that sub-region. We will conclude this regional analysis section with a forecast of the level and nature of the conflict, if any, which would ensue in those three potential arenas under three alternative scenarios of enemy behavior.

## Japan

Japan has been the engine of the Orient for over 100 years. Her basic and secondary industries have long helped to meet the needs of South and Southeast Asia for manufactured goods. Resource-poor Japan, in return, provided the decisive market for South Asian energy, mineral, food and fiber raw materials. It was the drive to cement this mercantile empire into a "greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" under Japanese political and military domination, immune to occidental meddling, that led to Pearl Harbor in 1941. Denied their empire by force of arms, a re-equipped Japan, led by a new managerial elite working in close tandem with a business-minded government, moved its sights higher, and by 1970 was penetrating the European and American markets for cars, ships, electronics and optical equipment, instrumentation, and, more recently, computer components.

The price of this new commercial empire, however, has been a polluted Japan with a left-wing blue collar labor movement, and a greater dependence than ever on South Asian food and raw materials, particularly energy. With characteristic vigor and vision, the Japanese are now attacking these problems by new programs of conservation and source-diversification, and more fundamentally by a long-term program of industrial restructuring. This entails the gradual phasing out of certain energy,<sup>1</sup> labor and land-intensive industries and shifting them to South and Southeast Asia (and perhaps farther afield) using Japanese capital and technology to develop cheap resources and labor in the countries concerned.<sup>2</sup> This will leave a Japan with a largely

white collar and professional labor force concentrating on knowledge-intensive industries.

In the throes of this industrial restructuring program, and facing other problems threatening the nation's economic security, the Japanese are in no mood to divert resources and management attention to a military build-up. They are keenly aware of expanding Soviet military power in the Western Pacific, and they recognize the threat posed by the Vietnamese further south to important Southeast Asian suppliers and customers, but they have been hoping against hope - and against growing evidence to the contrary - that somebody else (read the U.S.) will relieve them<sup>3</sup> of greater responsibility in the defense area.

In the meantime, Japanese expenditures on defense have not been insignificant. Geared roughly to 1 percent of GNP, they have risen from \$4.6 billion in 1975 to \$11.7 billion in 1981, and should exceed \$13 billion in 1982.<sup>4</sup>

It now appears likely that the Japanese will bow to American pressure, and to the realities of the Soviet/Vietnam threat to vital Japanese interests, and will gradually increase the percentage of GNP devoted to defense. They tacitly accept a moral obligation to do so, they know they need our strategic support, and they recognize that a growing Japanese arms industry specializing in sophisticated weaponry and dual - use equipment would be in harmony with their own industrial restructuring goals. By the mid-1990s, it can be anticipated that Japan will be spending perhaps 2 percent of its growing GNP on defense and that Japanese industry will have become a major free world supplier of several categories of high-technology defense

hardware. They may also be moving cautiously into the nuclear weapons field, with important implications for their receptivity to U.S. forward basing of such weapons. Growing cooperation between Japan and the PRC in economic ventures could have long-lasting effects on U.S. Army requirements in the region.

### North and South Korea (PRK and ROK)

The Korean peninsula will play an important role in relations among the great powers in Asia during the final two decades of this century. Surrounded by the Soviet Union, China, and Japan, the Korean peninsula serves as a strategic stronghold in East Asia, where the major Asian powers strive to exercise their influence over each other. Indeed, the existing entanglement of military alliances on the peninsula -- the U.S.-R.O.K. mutual defense treaty in 1954, and mutual defense treaties of U.S.S.R.-P.R.K. and P.R.C.-P.R.K. in 1961 -- and the presence of some 30,000 American combat forces in South Korea are symbols<sup>5</sup> of the great powers' strategic interest in the region.

Korea represents one of the most likely conflict areas in Asia during the remainder of this century. The armistice ending the Korean War in 1953 remains in force, and therefore the Korean peninsula is theoretically in a state of war. At the same time, militarily tied with the super powers, both South and North Korea are heavily armed and pursue continuous military modernization. In this connection, the high degree of hostility between the two Koreas is unlikely to abate, despite their proposals for peaceful reunification in the 1970s and the 1980s. It seems entirely probable that such complex circumstances will carry over to the 1990s.

The two Koreas will continue to pursue conflicting strategic goals through mutually antagonistic policies throughout the last decade of this century. South Korea's strategic policy of defense through deterrence will facilitate stability and security on the Korean peninsula. On the other hand, North Korea will

attempt to destabilize the situation on the Korean peninsula, because stability would result in a wider imbalance between the two koreas in economic, military, and technological capabilities. In the 1990s, therefore, Pyongyang's policy will be directed toward the achievement of its ultimate strategic objective of Korean unification on its own terms, under its own political authority.

North Korea will continue to possess a substantial conventional advantage over the South into the early 1990s in such categories as aircraft, submarines, tanks, and other ground weapons. By then, the stockpile of North Korea military equipment is expected to be double that of the South.<sup>6</sup> During the later part of that decade, however, that military imbalance will likely be corrected. In order to offset North Korean military superiority, South Korea will increase its efforts to expand its military modernization program,<sup>7</sup> effecting substantial increases in its military budget. Supported by a strong economy and high-level technology, the South Korean defense capability will be significantly reinforced qualitatively.

The last decade of this century will witness close South Korean strategic cooperation with the United States, Japan, and other allies. The United States will continue a strong public commitment to the security of South Korea. Faced with a growing Soviet and North Korean military threat, it is expected that South Korea and Japan will closely cooperate to maintain stability in the region. Most importantly, Japan may make

increasing contributions to the reinforcement of South Korea's<sup>8</sup> defense-related economy.

On the other hand, by the 1990s, it is likely that Sino-North Korean relations will become severely strained, as North Korean cooperation with the Soviet Union significantly improves. The North Korean leadership increasingly will lose confidence in Peking's reliability as the Chinese continue to pressure the Pyongyang regime to restrain its belligerent actions against the South. The Chinese strategic interest will lie in maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula, because conflict in Korea would necessarily confront China with the strategic choice of either supporting the P.R.K. and thus straining U.S.-P.R.C. relations, or else abandoning North Korea totally to Soviet<sup>9</sup> control.

More importantly, it can be expected that China will increase its contacts with South Korea, particularly in the fields of economy, trade, and technology.<sup>10</sup> This trend has already begun to develop in the early 1980s. The Pyongyang leadership will be deeply disturbed by this development.

Under such circumstances, Pyongyang will depend increasingly upon Moscow. From Pyongyang's perspective, potential South Korean cooperation with the U.S.-Japan-China entente will further weaken North Korea's relative strength vis-a-vis the South. And in light of a growing technological imbalance between the two Koreas, North Korean cooperation with the Soviet Union will be of increasing importance.

South Korea will likely suffer from political instability in the 1990s. Basic problems will be in leadership transitions and

internal power struggles between political factions. Contributing factors will be whether or not President Chun Doo Hwan steps down in 1988 as he promised to do in 1981, and who succeeds Chun.

Developments we can anticipate now suggest a high probability that the political situation will begin to deteriorate in the 1980s. 1988 is the year of the Olympic games in Seoul and the scheduled presidential election. The Olympic games are intended not only to upgrade South Korea's international prestige but also to help improve its diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with socialist countries and non-aligned nations. Seoul is banking heavily on its success. The North Koreans might well decide to attempt to prevent Seoul from holding the Olympic games, stepping up various "provocations" against the South. In view of the importance of the 1988 Olympic games and the heightened military threat from the North, Seoul's political leadership may well argue that political stability and security must be guaranteed by the continued leadership of President Chun Doo Hwan, extending his presidency for at least several years. Opposition party leaders and students will strongly argue that an extension of Chun's presidency will frustrate democratic political development. The outcome will be political and social instability. Such a confused political environment will carry over into the next decade.

The 1990s, therefore, may bring about a new leadership crisis. If Chun chooses to remain in power, he will be faced



with strong protest from the people and even some army officers which will exacerbate social and political instability. On the other hand, if he decides to retire, an internal power struggle among top leaders will follow. Under the current constitutional provisions, Chun's designated successor can be expected to easily be elected President because of the existence of a "rubber-stamp" electoral college. But historical experience shows that this will only intensify the power struggle among other potential leaders, and among Chun's followers in particular. In any event, a leadership change can be expected to occur in the 1990s, perhaps in a tumultuous manner. But the tenacity of the South Korean political system will tend to prevent any radical changes in ideology or national strategy. Clearly, the new political leader will be a man who has strong support from the military. At the same time, U.S. influence will greatly affect the course of the succession struggle, as happened following Park Chung-hee's assassination.

During the last two decades of this century, North Korea is also likely to be deeply involved in domestic factional political struggles primarily due to the leadership succession issue. It seems quite apparent that Kim Il-song will settle the issue of leadership succession by designating his forty-year-old son, Kim Chong-il, as his successor in the 1980s. Indeed, Kim "junior" has been viewed as heir apparent since the Sixth North Korea Worker's Party (KWP) Congress in 1980. No one but the two Kims in Pyongyang hold key positions within all three organs of the Central Committee of the KWP -- the Standing Committee of the Politburo, the Secretariat, and the Military Committee. The

North Korean regime has already launched a major campaign to create a cult for Kim Chong-il among all North Korean youths by training them as Kim Junior's Red Guards.

An important question is whether North Korean leaders within the party and the military will fully accept Kim Chong-il as their national leader. Creation of a so-called "Communist dynasty" is ideologically non-Marxist, non-Leninist, and an unprecedented event in Communist history. In view of potential internal resistance to Kim Il-song's efforts to assure the succession of his son,<sup>12</sup> factional struggles within the North Korean leadership will likely occur in the 1990s. Kim Chong-il and his faction are expected to face major opposition from two directions. One will be from within his family; the other will be from well-established party cadres and professional military leaders.

Kim Chong-il and his faction may well lose the power struggle, due to his insufficient experience and widespread domestic resistance. Under such circumstances, any subsequent leadership will almost certainly undertake a massive purge within the party and the military to eliminate Kim Chong-il's followers, and to downgrade Kim Il-song's image, much as was done by Mao Zedong's successors in China.

In the economic sphere, the pendulum swings more clearly to the South Korean side. In the 1980s, South Korea's export-oriented economy will be directed more toward stability rather than rapid expansion. Seoul's objective will be to recover from economic difficulties brought on by over-investment in heavy and

chemical industries, high inflation, and growing oil prices. Having completed its Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1982-1985), Seoul would hope to stabilize the South Korean economy and begin to move toward moderate expansion for the last decade of the century.

Throughout the 1990s, economic growth through exports will continue to be a major policy goal of South Korea. South Korea will increasingly emphasize the development of technology-intensive industries rather than labor-intensive export lines. While light industry products, including textiles, remain major export items, the contribution of heavy and chemical industry products to export growth will significantly expand.

In order to reduce its dependence upon oil, South Korea will accelerate its nuclear energy development programs, encouraging industries to switch to coal and increasing investment programs for greater use of natural gas.<sup>13</sup> By the early 1990s, nuclear and hydroelectric power use will increase in proportion to total energy use by more than 15-20 percent, while the share of oil will decrease by more than half. By the 1990s it is expected that more than ten nuclear power stations will be fully operational.

Throughout the final decade of the twentieth century, while close U.S.-R.O.K. trade and economic cooperation will be instrumental in South Korean economic development, South Korean-Japanese economic relations will significantly improve. Faced with the growing Soviet and North Korean military threat, Japan will make greater contributions to the strengthening of South Korea's economy and defense. During this decade, the ASEAN countries will emerge as a large raw-material source for an

industrializing South Korea. The region also will be a lucrative market for finished products from South Korea. In addition, close technological cooperation between South Korea and ASEAN will occur, particularly in the fields of mining, timber, and construction industries.

One important development in the 1990s likely will be an improvement of South Korean trade and economic relations with the socialist countries, including Eastern Europe and China. South Korea has already conducted indirect trade with a number of socialist countries through Hong Kong in past decades. By holding the 1988 Olympic games in Seoul, South Korea will obtain opportunities to increase its economic, technological, and cultural relations with non-hostile socialist countries.

In the 1990s, South Korea will be a modern industrial nation and have one of the strongest economies in the Pacific region. South Korea's Gross National Product (GNP) will continue to expand with an annual growth rate of 4-5 percent.<sup>14</sup>

During the remainder of this century, North Korea will retain its Stalinist command economy. Despite its greater emphasis upon light industry and agriculture in the Seven-Year Economic Development (1978-1984), North Korea will not be able to overcome its substantial economic difficulties throughout the 1980s due to large defense expenditures, huge foreign debts (currently estimated at \$2 billion), and overall industrial management problems. This trend will carry over to the final decade of this century.

Throughout the 1990s, North Korean economic policy will be directed toward further strengthening of the economic foundations of socialism through a "chuche" (self-reliant) oriented, modernized, scientific economy.<sup>15</sup> Pyongyang's specific goals include full utilization of North Korea's industrial capacity; strengthening of the fuel, energy, and resource bases of industry; substitution of domestic resources for imported ones to the extent possible; improvement of the transport system and completion of the modernization of agriculture. As in past decades, the industrial sector will remain the primary focus in the North Korean economy in the 1990s.

In an attempt to lessen its economic dependence upon the Soviet Union and China, Pyongyang will continue to seek Western technology and manufactured equipment. North Korea will attempt to turn to Japan and other European countries for joint ventures, particularly in mineral processing plants.<sup>16</sup> At the same time, Pyongyang will continue to emphasize mechanization-modernization in the agrarian sector in order to achieve self-sufficiency in food (probably with some success).

North Korean trade patterns are likely to change significantly in the last decade of this century. While its bilateral trade and economic relations with the Soviet Union will remain important, North Korea will commit itself to increased interaction with the advanced industrial world and the Middle East. North Korea's major export items will include cement, iron ore, and a number of nonferrous metals such as zinc and magnesium. Nevertheless, North Korea's heavy dependence upon Moscow and Peking for oil will remain intact into the 1990s.

As in the past, the North Korean GNP growth rate is likely to be lower than that of South Korea. With a three percent annual growth rate,<sup>17</sup> its population will increase to 38 million by the year 2000.

On balance, it would appear that the military stand-off between the two Koreas will survive the century (barring cataclysmic events elsewhere) and that the balance of strength will start shifting in Seoul's favor before 2000. South Korea, with a much larger GNP and rate of growth than the PRK's, is clearly in the stronger position to compete in a military build-up over the long haul.

## China (PRC)

The avowed long-term goal of the present Chinese regime is to build a "modern and powerful socialist country, which is prosperous, highly democractic and culturally advanced"<sup>18</sup>. On September 1, 1982, the Chinese leadership announced its goals for the interim term as: 1) pursue the modernization of China; 2) gain control of Taiwan; and, 3) upset the strategic plans of the superpowers, who are, in Chinese eyes, equal threats to world peace and both bent on global domination. Goals 2 and 3 have a faintly jingoistic ring...more appropriate to the Party Congress floor (where they were announced) than the Cabinet Room...but they have meaning and they go to the heart of China's role in the issues addressed in this study. What do they really mean in terms of 1) China's Taiwan strategy, both political and military, 2) the likelihood of conflict on the Sino-Soviet border and, 3) China's readiness to cooperate with the U.S. and its allies to keep the peace in East Asia?

We start from the assumption that China does want to keep the peace in East Asia, even across the Straits of Taiwan. China's whole military history in recent centuries has been one of defense against incursion rather than external adventurism. China did, of course, invade Tibet in 1959 and conduct a police action on the Vietnam border in 1979. They encouraged and supported our enemies in Korea and Vietnam and they have masterminded and funded Communist guerrilla movements throughout South Asia. But except in Tibet none of these actions resulted in territorial acquisition and they were not intended to. To the extent that they had a common rationale it was to have China's

borders adjoined by ideologically compatible neighbors. China has been ready, and at times eager, to export its political philosophy, but rarely has the People's Liberation Army (PLA) stepped off Chinese soil. In their present preoccupation with modernization, China's leaders are more interested than ever in a period of peace and stability long enough to complete that process. The Chinese also have a deep interest in exercising political leadership over the Third World. This interest requires a strong home base, undistracted by regional warfare. It also points up the importance of improved U.S. relations with the PRC, a country which, through its influence in the Third World, can either promote or work against U.S. strategy in the developing countries and the UN.

It is also assumed that the present leadership and like-minded successors will continue in power through the century. There are both hard-liner and liberal pressures on the regime, but they seem containable as long as the PLA stays out of politics. Moreover, some of the more important hard-liners were eased out of power in September 1982.

Current hard-liner pressures against the regime are especially persistent with regard to Taiwan. Some of the old guard apparently believe that the growing emphasis in Beijing on modernization, economic and technological cooperation with the West, and security against Soviet/Vietnam incursions, will shove Taiwan to the back burner - and they are obviously right. But all Beijing factions agree that it cannot remain on the back burner into the 1990s. The gradual replacement of Kuomintang



leaders and bureaucrats by native Taiwanese is eroding the logic of reunification. As the new Taiwan leadership finds itself increasingly isolated from U.S. and other Western support it may turn to the Soviets or Vietnamese, both of whom can be expected to respond rapidly and enthusiastically. It thus appears that Beijing will make a move on Taiwan about 1990, probably with an economic blockade backed up by air and naval forces which, ironically, may be using some American hardware by that time. If the Russians should intervene to break the blockade (American intervention is not deemed likely from today's perspective) or create a diversion on the Sino-Soviet frontier, there could be conflict of some intensity. That is why China/Taiwan is on our list of potential violence arenas.

The potential for conflict on the Sino-Soviet border is omnipresent if only because of the massive opposing forces in place. American arms deliveries to China will inevitably intensify the existing Soviet paranoia about the way things are going in China and could trigger at least low intensity Soviet-initiated border conflict, designed to keep China's backside close to the Russian fire. If this study is correct in its fundamental reading of Soviet global strategy (see the Task 2 paper on "Trends and Phenomena" pp. 1-3), however, there seems little prospect of planned warfare on a major scale between the U.S.S.R. and China before 2000. Indeed, it can be anticipated that the Chinese, while arming against the Soviet threat, will seek some kind of modus vivendi with Moscow to stabilize their relationship at a lower confrontational temperature, thereby retaining a "Soviet card" for dealing with the West.

It will be difficult for China to abandon cooperation with the West over the next ten years at least. During this period of economic and military modernization, China will need the kind of help that we are best at supplying.

On September 1, 1982, however, came Party Chairman Hu Yaobang's statement summarized at the beginning of this section, which appears to discard the concept of cooperation with the United States against the Soviet Union and instead portrays China as standing with the Third World between, and aloof from, both superpower blocs and bent on foiling the plans of both for "global domination". Coming as it did less than three weeks after a joint U.S./PRC declaration on U.S. military aid to Taiwan which had appeared - albeit precariously and ambiguously - to set that issue temporarily at rest, this shift to neutral in China's relationship with the West came as a distinct shock to the Administration. Such a shift was foreseen as likely, but not until later in this decade.

U.S. planners can find two morsels of consolation in this latest pronouncement. First, the Party Congress did not, as far as we are aware, make any move to deplore or decelerate on-going U.S. trade and investment programs in China or to close the door on U.S. military sales. Second, the same Congress announced plans to purge the Party of "unhealthy" (read Maoist) influences, thereby cementing the trend toward "pragmatism" in the Party's ideology and policies. Taken together, and they are related, these two points suggest that the move to distance China from the U.S. politically was a tactical one designed to enhance China's

credibility as leader of the Third World, and that the primary goal of modernizing China and its defense establishment with U.S. and other Western assistance remains intact.

In this spirit, we can expect the PRC to look to the U.S. for help in developing modern general-purpose forces with some limited offensive capability.<sup>19</sup> Their aim in this program will be to achieve a level of technological expertise high enough to deter conventional force harassment by the Soviets and Vietnamese and thereby keep the intensity of border clashes well below the nuclear threshold. In the meantime, the PRC will continue their missile and nuclear programs, which have already reached a significant plateau of sophistication.<sup>20</sup>

In our arms sales to China, we must tread a careful line between strengthening China's defensive capability and upsetting the military power balance in the region. For Army planners this may suggest a focus on, for example, anti-tank weapons.

## Taiwan (ROC)

Taiwan in 1982 is one of the strongest countries in the region, both economically and militarily, and we expect it to remain so through the 1980s. For the United States, the strategic importance of Taiwan (in the event of a crisis in the Western Pacific) continues to rise with the Soviet naval build-up and as off-shore drilling activity and long-standing territorial disputes in the area heighten the risk of conflict.

Yet the realistic prospect is for an increasingly remote security relationship between the United States and Taiwan over the balance of the century as stated above, the PRC is likely to make a strong move on Taiwan about the end of this decade. If U.S. political trends or the state of U.S./PRC relations at that time render U.S. intervention on Taiwan's side unthinkable (the most likely scenario), the Taipei government may turn to the Soviets. The presence of Soviet naval and air bases on the island would be equally unthinkable - and for both Washington and Beijing. On the horns of this dilemma, we may find ourselves in the anomalous position of trying to broker an arrangement between the ROC and PRC which will permit at least nominal PRC sovereignty over Taiwan in return for some kind of understanding that U.S. forces may use the island in the event of Soviet or Vietnamese provocation in the region. This is probably more than the PRC could stomach, even if Chinese interests were threatened. Moreover, by 1990 the Taiwanization of the island may have progressed to the point where ROC forces would be committed to fight for the island's complete independence.<sup>21</sup> Even if the PRC would tolerate such a solution, which is inconceivable at this

juncture, the posture of an independent Taiwan toward Soviet/Vietnamese encroachment on the mainland would be ambiguous at best.

The implication for Army planners is that we must either 1) cross Taiwan off our list of potential logistical bases for a conflict in the 1990s or 2) work actively with the PRC and ROC in the 1980s to achieve an understanding, perhaps in the form of a mutual security pact, which will ensure that Taiwan will cooperate, at least with the PRC, in containing specified kinds of Soviet/Vietnamese encroachment. If we are to maintain any kind of constructive relationship with mainland China - and this appears essential to vital U.S. interests in the Western Pacific, alternative 2) may be our only acceptable course. If so, we should start moving on it now, because time is working against us.

## The Philippines

The Philippines is by far our least stable ally in the Western Pacific and yet is the country where we have our third largest military presence. It is a country with wide and widening disparities between rich and poor, severe population pressures, and a mismanaged, deteriorating economy. There is a strong prospect for rising internal unrest abetted, though not necessarily initiated, by Communist agitators. If the situation should get out of hand, the armed forces may intervene to restore order, but would probably replace Marcos with another civilian of similar conservative ideology, thus by itself bringing no long-term solution to the nation's problems.

Even the present embattled regime is equivocal about the future of the 1947 U.S.- Philippine Military Bases Agreement. As currently modified, the Agreement must be reviewed every five years (next in 1984) and will run out in 1991.<sup>22</sup> It would appear highly likely that the Marcos administration, or any comparably conservative successor, will stay with the Agreement because of its importance to the nation's economy (our bases employ close to 45,000 Filipinos) and military security. But unless something is done to redress serious imbalances in wealth and social justice, the danger of fundamental and possibly violent political change before the year 2000 cannot be discounted. The viability of our bases there would then be open to serious question, and the use of force to retain them is not an attractive option.

The maintenance of our existing bases in the Philippines is considered by this study as vital to U.S. interests in the Western Pacific. This is not to say, however, that our vital

interests would necessarily be fatally impaired if we relocated to more politically secure locations in the vicinity. U.S. planners should explore such possibilities on a contingency basis. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's report on United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations (April 1979) discusses the relative merits for the purpose of Darwin, Cockburn Sound, Surabaya, Penang, and Singapore. To that list might be added Guam, North Borneo, and possibly some of the Western Marianas. Most of these sites are remote from the vital sealanes and potential conflict areas covered by the Philippine bases and all present formidable problems of adaptation and local staffing, but prudence demands a closer examination of their potential in the context of our projected needs and capabilities in the region in the 1990s.

### Island States and Dependencies in the Southwestern Pacific

The nine independent island states and several dependencies in the Southwestern Pacific are strategically important because they lie athwart the U.S. trade and supply routes to the ANZUS and ASEAN areas and to the Indian Ocean. The Soviets have already made diplomatic overtures to some of the independent states and may try to exploit some of the ethnic and economic tensions that exist there between the native and expatriate populations. This situation should be carefully monitored.

Of special importance to the United States are the U.S. Trust Territories of the Pacific (the Northern Marianas, Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands). We have the obligation to provide for their defense and the right to establish military bases there and exclude others from doing so. Our rights include the storage of nuclear weapons.<sup>23</sup> In anticipation of the possibility of loss of our Philippine bases, Army planners should consider the feasibility and desirability of deploying a small, mobile Special Operations unit, with appropriate airlift and resupply, on one of the westernmost islands (Palau or Saipan) for the dual purpose of contributing to the defense of the country and providing a quick reaction capability for low intensity conflict situations in the Southwestern Pacific.



## Malaysia

Though racially divided and the scene of past Communist incursions, Malaysia now has the money, management, and military power to defend its short land boundary (with Thailand) in the unlikely contingency of Vietnamese incursion into the peninsula. Political upheaval in Indonesia, however, which is a distinct possibility before 2000, could quickly spread to Sarawak and the mainland and constitutes a significant, but for the time being a distant, threat to Malaysian stability. Malaysia has just over 100,000 men in its AD defense force. There is also an Australian Air Force presence of two squadrons.

## Singapore

This island city-state is an island of prosperity, stability and good management in an area where such traits are rare. As a vocal critic of the Vietnamese with excellent logistical facilities dominating waterways considered vital to U.S. interests, Singapore could serve as the fulcrum of U.S. deployment in the unlikely event of a major Soviet/Vietnamese military attack on the ASEAN region. Singapore, like Malaysia, is supported by the Five Power Defense Arrangement of November 1971 involving Britain, Australia and New Zealand, and New Zealand has an airmobile infantry battalion on the island.

## Indonesia

Indonesia is currently stable but has the latent potential for explosive upheaval a la Iran which could destabilize neighboring Malaysia and expose ASEAN's southern flank. This is a danger that must be monitored and provided for in U.S. contingency planning.<sup>24</sup> Indonesia has an AD military strength of 273,000, but little offensive capability.

## Kampuchea and Vietnam

The present tripartite conflict in Kampuchea is expected to continue indecisively at least through the 1980s. It is a classic proxy war (to the extent that Vietnam can be regarded as a Soviet proxy) and is being fought close to the heart of the ASEAN alliance. A significant Vietnamese victory in Kampuchea followed by a strong probe over the Thai border, and perhaps accompanied by Soviet naval posturing in the Gulf of Thailand, could convince the ASEAN members that their alliance is, in practice, a paper tiger, and lead them to seek separate accommodation with Hanoi. An orchestrated outbreak of terrorism in the ASEAN capitals could hasten the process.

As of now, the only major power working actively and overtly to inhibit a decisive Vietnamese victory in Kampuchea is the PRC, which is supporting one guerrilla faction (the Khmer Rouge) and, more importantly, tying down several Vietnamese divisions on the Chinese border. While there is every indication that the Chinese will persevere in this strategy, there is no assurance that it will be sufficient to pin the Vietnamese down indefinitely. The deployment of Soviet naval power in the Gulf of Tonkin, for example, or a buildup of Red Army provocation along the Sino-Soviet border could force the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army to pull in its horns and release Vietnamese forces for a concerted campaign in Kampuchea. All told, the Vietnamese have more than one million AD personnel to work with. The Soviets doubtless perceive ASEAN for what it is - a weak, poorly-coordinated widely scattered grouping of politically shaky states with competing economic interests, united only by their fear of Soviet,

Vietnamese and/or Chinese imperialism and subversion. Western military aid can, over time, strengthen ASEAN armed forces, but it will have only marginal impact on the unity and political will of the ASEAN states to engage in open battle against such powerful foes. The Soviets will see ASEAN as a hollow coconut that can be shattered by a single, well-placed blow.

Is ASEAN so fragile? Probably not. But repeated demonstrations of Soviet/Vietnamese power in the region, coupled with a combination of Soviet economic aid offers and perceived American indifference, could bring enough of a shift in the diplomatic orientation of one or two ASEAN members to render the organization inoperative as a possible framework for military cooperation. ASEAN is not, after all, a Western alliance. Except for the Philippines, and possibly Thailand, its members are Third World neutrals. The appearance of siding with the West against the East makes some of them uncomfortable. Bilateral non-aggression pacts with Vietnam, for example, would permit them to shift scarce resources to their urgent internal needs. Once disarmed and introverted, it would be a short next step for them to deny military overflight rights and other accommodations to the U.S. Indeed, this might be a feature of any rapprochement with Hanoi.

The dividends to the Soviets from cracking the ASEAN coconut would be far-reaching. They could expect at least to neutralize Southeast Asia politically and militarily, depriving the United States of access to vital sea lanes, air routes, and potential forward staging areas. They might even cow some of the states

into concluding mutual defense arrangements providing for a land-based Soviet or Vietnamese military presence in a strategic location.

It seems that the growing evidence of an aggressive Soviet/Vietnamese strategy in Southeast Asia and of an expanding capability to implement it clearly represents a threat to vital U.S. interests. Our ASEAN friends, even with indirect PRC help, seem ill-equipped politically and militarily to contain that threat. In our view, we need an integrated U.S. land-sea-air base somewhere in or near the ASEAN area (but well west of the Philippines) of sufficient size and maneuver capability to deter an unlikely major Soviet/Vietnamese attack, but more importantly to strengthen ASEAN cohesion and resolve in the face of highly likely low-intensity provocations. Our recommendations in this respect will be covered later in this paper.

## Thailand

Thailand will be the "front line state" if and when Vietnam, with the Soviet navy's passive support, makes its move to demoralize and destroy ASEAN. It is the only ASEAN country the Vietnamese can reach by land, and it is vulnerable to an outbreak of internal subversion timed to coincide with a sharp border probe. It has the military strength to contain such a probe, particularly since, in our scenario, the probe would have only limited objectives in time and duration. But the humiliation to the Bangkok government of an apparently effortless demonstration of Vietnamese military superiority on Thai soil, coupled with orchestrated unrest in the capital, could topple the administration in office with demoralizing reverberations in other ASEAN countries.

The best, and perhaps the only, Thai defense against this Vietnamese gambit would appear to be imaginative contingency planning against it, combined with stepped-up intelligence activity, with U.S. and PRC support, to anticipate its timing and location. For maximum impact it would have to take place as close to Bangkok as possible, at a time when Communist underground strength in Bangkok and a Vietnamese Army presence on the border is relatively strong, and at a time when the Thai Government is in political disarray for whatever reason.

### Australia-New Zealand

The ANZUS role in the peace and stability of Southeast Asia is important and multi-faceted. Both Australia and New Zealand provide U.S. access to ports, airfields and other facilities, which, among other benefits, permits U.S. forces to deploy to the Persian Gulf via Australia. Both assist in the surveillance and patrolling of vital sea lanes and could interdict some in an emergency. Both contribute significantly to the political and economic development of the emerging Pacific island nations and to the confidence of ASEAN with regard to the integrity of their southern flank.

Current trends suggest that both the Australians and New Zealanders will continue to strengthen their military capabilities throughout the rest of this century in response to their perception of an enhanced Soviet threat.



## REGIONAL DETERMINANTS AND POSSIBLE FUTURES

This study identifies three situations of potential conflict in East Asia between now and 2000 which could involve U.S. intervention: 1) North Korea-South Korea, 2) China-Taiwan, and 3) Vietnam-Thailand. These three cockpits of violence are largely unrelated. The adversaries do not overlap, though North Korea and Vietnam are both, to a degree, Soviet proxies. An outbreak of one conflict would not, of itself, trigger either of the other two. The probable scenarios range from high intensity, main force warfare (with U.S. troop involvement) in Korea, to a low intensity probe in Thailand, to military and economic pressure against Taiwan. The likelihood of U.S. military involvement ranges from virtually certain in Korea to almost nil in Taiwan. There is no reason to assume any congruence in the timing of these conflicts; each has dynamics of its own. But all three seem rather more likely to break out before 1992 than after.

In assessing the U.S. ability to influence the course of violent events in East Asia, we must distinguish between the courses open to us to help prevent their occurrence, and the contingency plans we must lay to promote a satisfactory outcome where they do occur. The status quo in all three situations is satisfactory to us; our prime goal should be to sustain it; and a projection of force may be useful to that end. But if conflict erupts, our prime goal should be to contain it, avoiding either horizontal or vertical escalation. The use of our force may not in all cases be conducive to that end. It is for the elected

administration to define "satisfactory outcome", but World War III will not be a part of the definition.

It is more than arguable that the Soviet Union and her well-armed vessels in North Korea and Vietnam have geopolitical ambitions in the Far East. The status quo holds few charms for them. Moscow presumably wants (if Sino-Soviet rapprochement fails) to flank the PRC from every side, secure naval and air bases in the eastern Indian Ocean, communize, or at least further neutralize, the ASEAN states, project Soviet power eastward into the Pacific, preempt the strategic raw material resources of the region and wall off the Indian Ocean to U.S. military access from the east. The North Koreans want control over their whole peninsula, and the Vietnamese want at least unchallenged domination over Indo-China and its adjacent islands, waters, and off-shore resources.

Put it also seems clear that the Communist side wants to achieve these ends with the minimum use of force. They have other fish to fry pretty much throughout the Torrid Zone and would rather prevail through a show of force than the expensive and protracted use of it. World War III is not, in our view, on the Soviet agenda for the 20th century. What seems most likely is the adoption by the Soviets and their proxies of a "Chinese water treatment" approach, combining power, subversion and diplomacy to nudge events along in a desired direction. The short term aim will be to shift vulnerable governments leftward and against the West. The longer term goal will be to inject Soviet power into the areas thus "tenderized".

To a large extent, the United States will be hostage to trends and events in the region which are beyond our control. These include economic conditions, leadership changes, the course of Sino-Soviet relations, and the reaction of the Communist countries to the likely erosion of their relative position in the region.

On the other hand, a number of vital components of stability are at least arguably subject to current policy decisions emanating from Washington. These include the future course of United States relations with the South Pacific island nations, the extent of political and perhaps economic pressure on Japan to bolster its contribution to regional security duties, the degree of continued enhancement of South Korea's deterrent forces, the duration of South Korean political stability, and the size and quality of U.S. force projection capabilities for the 1990s.

America's ability to influence events in East Asia and counter the likely Soviet strategy will be limited unless we can project more power into Southeast Asia. This is at the same time the most vulnerable and the most vital area of the whole region if we aspire to control events in the Indian Ocean and contain the Vietnamese. In Northeast Asia, where we have power in place, our situation is stronger and should continue to improve. ROK force improvement and heavier Japanese defense expenditures are attainable objectives. The Chinese should prove a helpful stabilizing force in the north. But in the south, the governments are shakier, their demographic, ethnic and economic problems are more intractable, and they are neutral friends rather than committed allies. The Chinese to the north and

Australia and New Zealand to the south are stabilizing influences against the common foe, but the middle of that strategic sub-region is a power vacuum, which the Soviets may seek to fill if we don't.

With the presumed Soviet strategy in mind, we have projected three alternative futures for East Asia and the Western Pacific basin. The first and most optimistic scenario -- which is also considered the most likely -- sees the 1990s as a period of relative political calm and economic progress in the region, with minor outbreaks of violence both within and between some of the states, but with the three major conflict situations stalemated by an uneasy balance of power. The second scenario, less attractive but also less likely, features economic turmoil in the region, followed by political and social disintegration, and culminating in one or more serious outbreaks of conflict which inexorably lead to superpower confrontation. The final scenario, considered highly unlikely, projects the situation as proceeding in accordance with the presumed Soviet strategy for the region, i.e., expanded Soviet power, rapprochement with China and a socialization of the entire region under Soviet/China/Vietnam hegemony, achieved through a "Chinese water torture" process involving the occasional use of force but no major conflict. This third scenario, which was not in the regional paper, is included because it illustrates what could happen if the United States should, for whatever reason, so reduce its military presence in East Asia that the power balance would shift to the Communists and thus undermine the capacity and will of the non-

Communist states to resist. In that event, all U.S. interests in the area would disintegrate.

The events in each scenario have been roughly time-phased to show how, and at what speed, one sequence of events will tend to lead to another. It is emphasized that the probability percentage figures cited refer to the underlying atmosphere of the scenario rather than to its enactment in detail.

Scenario 1 (greater stability)

Probability 65%

1983-1989

This is a period of reasonable economic stability and growth. Death or resignation of President Marcos brings abler and more liberal government to power and U.S. bases agreement is extended with a long-term lease. U.S. and Japanese investment in ASEAN countries eases unemployment, fiscal and balance of payments problems there. Chinese and Thai-supported guerrilla factions in Kampuchea and Laos work together to throw Vietnamese out and establish reasonably "pragmatic" regime under Chinese tutelage. There is sporadic low-intensity violence on Sino-Soviet and Sino-Vietnamese borders and guerrilla-inspired internal unrest in South Korea and some ASEAN countries, but with economic pressures eased there is little popular participation. Japan strengthens defense budget and begins investment in arms production. China, though avowedly aloof from both superpowers, remains open to U.S. trade and investment and buys U.S. arms. Pressure on Taiwan issue emerges periodically but is not strident. Status quo continues in Korea.

1990-1995

Economic situation fluctuates globally, but growing regional interdependence and self-sufficiency insulate East Asia from serious recession. North Korean military build-up tapers off as regime seeks to satisfy domestic pressure for improved living standards and to develop Western export markets. South Korean force improvement program achieves rough parity with North and permits partial withdrawal of U.S. forces. China, still under pragmatic leadership, reaches agreement with Taiwan involving

recognition of titular Chinese sovereignty in return for local autonomy and preferential Taiwan access to Chinese market. There is sporadic low-intensity conflict between China and Vietnam over off-shore drilling rights in Gulf of Tonkin and near Spratly and Paracel islands. Japan becomes major supplier of high technology equipment with a military application. ASEAN countries achieve military force improvement goods and shift resources to economic and social programs.

#### 1996-2000

Growing relative strength of South Korea, withdrawal of Chinese support of Pyongyang and preoccupation with economic problems and opportunities lead to overthrow of Kim faction in North Korea and to tacit abandonment of hopes for forcible reunification. U.S. Army presence in Korea reduced to token force. Talks aimed at peaceful unification on basis of equality become serious. Vietnam, beset by economic problems, frustrated in its imperialist goals in Indo-China, and saddled with an increasingly obsolete military establishment, begins to look more to China than Soviet Union for military and economic aid. Thwarted by stronger and more sophisticated Chinese military, sharply reduced prospects for mischief-making in Korea, and general prosperity and cohesion of non-Communist East Asian states, U.S.S.R. turns its strategic attention to softer targets in other world regions.

Scenario 2 (less stability)

Probability 30%

1983-1989

Death of Marcos brings civil war in Philippines and left-wing victory. U.S. bases agreement renounced and U.S. forced to withdraw. Moscow seizes opportunity to encourage Vietnamese probes against Thailand, which demoralize and topple Thai government and bring martial law. China, supported by Japan seeks UN sanctions against Vietnam and initiates severe harassment tactics on Vietnamese border. Soviets counter with heightened harassment on Sino-Soviet border and with missile strikes on PRC nuclear installations. Thailand invokes U.S. military intervention under Manila Pact, but U.S. drags feet because of political opposition in CONUS and real logistical problems created by loss of Philippine bases.

1990-1995

North Korea, encouraged by Soviet Union and by apparent U.S. indecision and disarray, sends several strong commando units into South Korea to conduct guerrilla attacks against strategic targets and rural population centers but avoiding U.S. base areas. South Korea mobilizes, launches massive counter attack to protect Seoul at all costs and invokes 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty to demand transfer of \$2 billion in U.S. War Reserve Stock material and U.S. logistical support. Japan, despite heavy domestic opposition, provides limited and largely covert support to ROK forces but does not get militarily involved and does not permit U.S. to resupply South Korea via Japan. Thus, U.S. is forced to utilize Taiwan bases, thereby exacerbating U.S. rela-



tions with PRC which has adopted neutral stance in Korean conflict.

1996-2000

Korean conflict continues at low to medium intensity with limited-objective raids conducted inconclusively by both sides. U.S. forces take occasional casualties but leave brunt of fighting to ROK units. PRC threatens to close door on U.S. trade and investment unless U.S. abandons Taiwan bases. U.S. feels forced to comply and shifts forward depots for South Korean resupply to Guam and Palau. PRC thereupon launches economic blockade to bring Taiwan to her knees and recognize Chinese sovereignty. With U.S. deprived of bases in Southeast Asia, Vietnam, assisted by ostentatious Soviet Navy maneuvers, continues pressure on Thailand and seeks to breakup shaky ASEAN "alliance." Century thus ends with tension and occasional conflict in both Korea and Southeast Asia and with U.S. interests in region under constant threat.

Scenario 3 (Moscow best case scenario)

Probability 5%

1983-1989

Same as in Scenario 2

1990-1995

"Inherent contradictions of capitalist system" bring new world-wide recession. North Korea, encouraged by U.S. disarray following loss of Philippine bases and domestic economic setbacks, launches strong commando raids into South Korea. American proletariat, weary of big Pentagon budgets at expense of social programs and fearing "new Vietnam" against North Korean freedom fighters, successfully demands immediate U.S. troop withdrawal. South Korea, isolated by her allies and in domestic political turmoil, seeks nonaggression pact with Pyongyang in return for unilateral demobilization. This is granted as interim measure. "Hegemonist" Beijing regime is replaced by Leninist faction which proposes Comintern summit to resolve ideological differences. Tension eases along China's northwestern and southern frontiers. PRC exploits situation to blockade Taiwan, which without support from any quarter is forced to succumb. Vietnam, relieved of PRC harassment, sends force to aid freedom fighters under siege in Bangkok after widespread riots. Thai Royal Family decamps and reactionary Bangkok regime is replaced by peace-loving worker's party. ASEAN states, too weak, divided, and remote to intervene, steer clear of involvement and concentrate on suppressing their own unhappy masses.

1996-2000

South Korea agrees to reunification on basis of magnanimous Pyongyang terms. Japan, now virtually surrounded by peace-loving communists and deprived of her traditional markets in impoverished West, negotiates long-term barter agreements with China, Korea, Vietnam, and the U.S.S.R. as part of the new East Asian Prosperity Bloc. ASEAN countries also join, deposing their fascist ruling cliques. East Asia becomes neutralist region under Soviet nuclear umbrella, and is closed by valiant Soviet Navy and Air Force to all U.S. imperialist access.

## STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS

### American Moods up to 2000

25

The "Moods" paper in this study suggests that the isolationist, or "introvert" phase in American public opinion with regard to U.S. involvement in external conflict hit its NADIR in the mid-1970s, and that by the late 1980s the majority of Americans will begin to show more appetite for an interventionist American military role in world affairs. It is concluded that the 1980 Reagan mandate for a stronger defense establishment was an aberration from the secular trend and will not long survive. Thus, the Army (and the other services) will probably not get in the 1980s all the funding for advanced weapons systems and manpower that it will need for the 1990s when the popular mood is expected to be more adventurist. On the other hand, the paper also points out that public enthusiasm for actual conflict, as opposed to the peaceful projection of power, tends to reach its peak only after the apex in the "mood curve" has passed -- in this cycle after the year 2000. It can be extrapolated from this that while Americans may be evincing in the 1990s a rising willingness to project power in the world and to use it to smother outbreaks of low-intensity violence, they will not be psychologically ready to risk a major war before the turn of the century.

This American popular aversion to military risk-taking in the 1990s will probably be more pronounced with regard to the East Asian region than to any other for two reasons: 1) The memory of Vietnam, still generally perceived as a costly failure, will linger, and 2) that part of the world is more geographically

remote and less demonstrably vital to our national political and economic interests than Western Europe, the Persian Gulf or the Caribbean. Pearl Harbor notwithstanding, few Americans feel militarily threatened on our western approaches, whereas most Americans associate East Asia with military frustration and national humiliation. South Korea, in particular, and to a lesser extent the Philippines, have a vaguely unsavory odor in the American mind, and few Americans would be enthusiastic about the expenditure of American lives or money to defend them. Even fewer will understand why our military access to and through Southeast Asia could be important to the defense of the Persian Gulf, an area about which they are genuinely concerned.

For Army planners, all this implies that any enlargement of the Army's presence in East Asia will be very difficult to sell to the American people and their representatives in Congress. Indeed, the phased withdrawal of American troops from Korea, if and when the threat there recedes, would be a popular move, demonstrating -- as it would -- that their lengthy and expensive mission there had achieved its purpose. Fortunately, the most likely scenario for the region up to 2000 does not suggest the need for a larger Army presence and does, in fact, anticipate that a partial withdrawal from Korea will be militarily feasible in the early 1990s.

American attitudes toward the Army, particularly among young people, appear to be more positive now than at any time since Vietnam. ROTC and related civilian training programs are more popular and recruitment problems have substantially eased. Youth

unemployment and inflated costs of higher education are doubtless important factors in this trend. The absence from the media of conflict situations involving the Army may be another. Perhaps the Army is seen as somehow less "nuclear" or more conventional than the other services. But it goes beyond that. There seems to be a growing perception that the Army is a respectable institution, more competent and "high technology" than ever, less plagued by drug problems and racial tensions.

All this helps the recruiters, but it also implies a higher receptivity to public information programs addressed to a wider American audience. The Army's recruiting commercials are familiar to most Americans but there is less understanding of the Army's peacekeeping role. Why do we have 30,000 American boys in Korea, of all places? What U.S. interests are they defending? Why can't they come home? The lack of a clear popular understanding (even among the troops themselves) of our purpose and mission in Vietnam was arguably the prime reason for its precipitate abandonment. The Army can ill-afford a similar communications gap on Korea. Yet one almost certainly exists and it will get wider as budgets get tighter and the perception of threat from North Korea diminishes. "M.A.S.H." has not been helpful. To fend off and defuse public pressure on the Korean issue over the years ahead, it is important that the Army start now to educate the electorate on the 2nd Division's role in Korea and why their presence there is the most cost-effective means to defend identified American interests in the Western Pacific.

### Will U.S. Interests Change?

The importance of East Asia and the Western Pacific to U.S. interests will not change greatly in character before 2000 but will almost certainly rise in degree. If the PRC continues along its current "pragmatist" course and is reasonably open to U.S. trade and investment, China could easily become one of the most significant expansive factors in our balance of payments. A discovery of exploitable oil in the South China Sea could materially affect the global supply/demand ratio for energy and add one more item to the already imposing list of vital raw materials for which East Asia is a significant source. We can expect American fixed investment in the region to rise significantly as the world economy expands, not only in China and in off-shore oil, but also in extractive or labor-intensive industries throughout the area, from North Korea to Australia and even in the Pacific Islands. We need unimpeded economic access to East Asia to develop and exploit these opportunities and to play our part in the development of the region itself.

The political importance of China as the world's most populous country, as a leader of the Third World, and as a member of the UN Security Council will certainly rise, and rise rapidly, even if the regime focuses mainly on its domestic concerns. Indonesia and Malaysia are among the more articulate and influential countries in the Third World, and will themselves be influenced by the Soviet/U.S. power balance in their home region, and by the orientation of China.

Our military obligations and commitments in the area will probably remain at least constant. Japan, South Korea, the

Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand will most probably remain our military allies through 2000, and we have some Manila Pact commitment to the defense of Thailand. ASEAN will continue to look to us for military supplies and, if the threat from Vietnam or the U.S.S.R. should become more ominous, the ASEAN neutrals might conceivably seek shelter under a U.S. umbrella.

Our military access through East Asia will remain vital indefinitely. If strategic waterways like the Strait of Malacca were closed to our Navy, Seventh Fleet reaction time to emergencies in the Indian Ocean would be intolerably protracted. No conceivable improvement in the range of military aircraft would permit our global air routes to function without overflight rights, and some refueling rights, in Southeast Asia.

From the negative standpoint, East Asia has a high propensity for violence, with at least the possibility of horizontal escalation. Violence involving China, a nuclear power, or Korea could escalate vertically. There is ethnic, demographic, religious and/or economic tension in most countries of the region. At least three of our friends there (South Korea, the Philippines, and Indonesia) have potentially explosive scenarios of political succession. To protect our vital interests there, we may need to show or use force to smother the resulting low intensity conflict and/or to evacuate American nationals. Thus we will need appropriate units in the right place. As of now we are in a poor position to project credible ground force power in Southeast Asia.



### Probable Missions

The general Army mission in East Asia and the Western Pacific basin will be to deter by its presence hostile military aggression against any allied or friendly state in the region and, to the extent compatible with its capabilities, U.S. treaty obligations, and friendly government requests, to defeat such aggression if it should occur.

Secondary missions may include the security of U.S. bases, depots, and logistical facilities from hostile attack or harassment, the evacuation of U.S. nationals from troubled zones, the training of friendly forces, intelligence-gathering, civil action programs near base areas, and back-up medical services.

The basic assumption underlying the Army's general mission, except in Korea, is that friendly indigenous forces will be responsible for initial containment and repulse of any external attack or internal insurrection. This would appear to preclude U.S. Army involvement in any low intensity conflict not on U.S. soil or affecting U.S. installations. Only if the conflict should escalate, or threaten to escalate, beyond the host country's capacity to contain it, would the question of Army intervention arise. At that time, we assume that all of the following conditions would have to be present before Army deployment would be ordered:

- o The existence of a formal, unambiguous host government request for U.S. military intervention
- o The availability of an Army force capable of discharging the mission

- o The availability of necessary trooplift and a secure DZ
- o Either a treaty obligation to respond or a clear threat to a vital U.S. interest inherent in the conflict.

It is difficult to visualize such a decision being made at below the White House level.

Of those countries where the United States has vital security arrangements, there are three which are unlikely to need ground force assistance. These are New Zealand, Australia, and Japan. New Zealand and Australia are not threatened by either internal or external forces. Japan has a well trained self-defense ground force. Only if Okinawa were to be invaded would U.S. ground force assistance be required and this would be furnished most likely by the U.S. Marine Corps. Palau, the Marshall Islands, and Micronesia will not be in any position to fight a war, and are unlikely to be attacked before 2000.

On the other hand, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand all could use U.S. assistance, but for different reasons. South Korea will continue to need a substantial U.S. military presence to deter a North Korean invasion. The Philippines could use mutual support troops to help put down insurgencies. Thailand is now relying on the PRC to restrain the Vietnamese, but it gets most of its equipment from the United States. Thus logistical support, not fighting troops, would be required.

Of the other countries which have bilateral agreements with the United States and where vital security arrangements are involved, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore all might need U.S. assistance of some type, but the reluctance of the American public

to have ground troops engaged in combat on the Asian land mass militates against direct military involvement in terms of committing soldiers, at least in the 1980s. This is also true of Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. In addition, the U.S. would presumably be prepared to participate in conjunction with its friends and allies in defending the strategically important areas of the Soya, Tsugaru, Tsushima, Malacca, Lombok, Sunda, Torres, and Macassar Straits using naval and air units.

Thus, the commitment of U.S. ground combat troops to a conflict in East Asia outside Korea does not appear likely under any scenario before 2000. Scenario 1 assumes improving friendly force capabilities and a declining threat, while scenarios 2 and 3 assume a diminished U.S. Army reaction capability in Southeast Asia. Most foreseeable contingencies will in any case be more appropriate for naval, air, or USMC reaction than for the Army. The most likely contingency outside Korea that could involve the Army would be a civil disturbance in a country where there is an Army presence, i.e., Japan or the Philippines.

Nevertheless, the deterrence element of the Army's general mission is dangerously flawed by the total absence of Army formations west and south of the Philippines. Indeed, there is no credible Army reaction force south of Korea. This problem will be addressed later in this paper.

The Army's mission in South Korea is of long standing and well understood by the Army staff. It is fully compatible with the general East Asian mission articulated above. Thus far it has been successfully discharged. There is little doubt that the

29,000 U.S. Army personnel in South Korea (plus the other USMC and Army units elsewhere in the Pacific available for commitment in Korea), and the U.S. commitment to South Korea's territorial integrity that they symbolize, have been the chief deterrent to Soviet/PRK adventurism on the peninsula. That will continue to hold true until the unacceptable asymmetry between North and South Korean military power has been redressed.

The Army's task now is to ensure that the ROK does not come to view our presence as a viable substitute for the vigorous prosecution of their force improvement program. A perception in the United States that the Koreans are replacing their budget with ours could have fatal consequences on American public opinion.

The Army's training mission in East Asia will become increasingly important in the 1990s as more sophisticated Army weapons systems flow into Korea, Japan, ANZUS, ASEA, and (perhaps) China. Weapons training inevitably abuts on military science and tactics, and thus on doctrine and concepts. To the extent that we can harmonize the military philosophy and methodology of our friends and allies with our own, to that extent will our combined effectiveness in a crisis be enhanced. Such a harmonization would also tend to promote a receptivity to American-made hardware - a distinct plus from several viewpoints. Above all, of course, it enhances friendly government capabilities in deterring and containing low intensity conflict, thereby reducing the number of contingencies which might call for a U.S. military response.

The propensity for violence in East Asia highlights the importance of the joint State/DOD Emergency Evacuation Plans, which provide for the orderly removal of U.S. citizens from a crisis zone by U.S. means. These are, of course, highly classified but they typically allow for some redundancy. If, in response to Scenario 2, the Army acquires a Special Operations capability in Southeast Asia, it could well play a useful role in this planning, which has traditionally been dominated by the other services.

### Manpower Needs and Forces Available

Total Army manpower requirements for the East Asian theater are expected to remain roughly constant into the early 1990s. Under Scenario 1, they would then begin to decline rather rapidly as the forces in Korea are drawn down. Under Scenario 2, however, which projects more or less constant low to medium intensity conflict in both Korea and Southeast Asia, the Army presence would remain constant throughout the century, and could increase if Army elements are forward-based in or near Southeast Asia.

For purposes of discussion, we will assume that something like Scenario 1 will prevail, that the Army's combat role in the region will be confined to Northeast Asia and that if a high intensity conflict situation should arise unexpectedly in Korea it would be met with forces already in that area on in the Western Pacific.

To put the Army's manpower needs in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific in proper perspective, it is necessary first to examine the total assets available to the United States in the region. It is assumed that the assets presently available will also be available to the various services in the 1990s.

The USAF has the 5th Air Force stationed in Japan and the 13th Air Force in the Philippines. Strategic bombers are based on Guam. In Korea, the 18th and 51st Tactical Fighter Wings support ground forces and provide air defense. In addition, USMC aircraft from the 3rd Marine Amphibious Force are available on the west coast of the United States, as is the 22nd Air Force which has squadrons of C141 and C5A airlift aircraft.

Headquarters for U.S. Air Force in the Pacific are in Hawaii. The stationing of these forces in the area enables the Air Force to transport Army troops to any place in the region, to put heavy concentrations of conventional and nuclear weapons on enemy forces, and to provide close air support to U.S. and allied ground forces.

The U.S. Navy (not considering the USMC) has a submarine force operating throughout the Pacific with some of the submarines equipped with nuclear tipped missiles. There are several squadrons of P3 aircraft equipped to detect and attack enemy submarines. The 7th Fleet consists of a variable number of carrier attack groups and sufficient amphibious craft to transport several USMC Marine Amphibious Units (MAUs) which are marine infantry battalions with combat support elements and services.

The USMC continues to deploy two divisions in the Pacific arena. One is stationed in California but has a Marine Amphibious Brigade ready to deploy to Southeast Asia. The other division has elements afloat, in Okinawa, in Japan, and in the state of Hawaii. These two divisions make it possible to commit less U.S. Army troops to the region. The USMC is the prime candidate to accomplish many ground missions which would fall to the army were the marines not available. Thus guarding the naval base at Subic Bay in the Philippines would be properly a USMC mission as opposed to an army one. Defense of the new island states would also normally be a USMC responsibility. The marines on Okinawa and Japan can reasonably expect to be employed in

Korea and should be considered in the U.S. Army strategy for the the peninsula.

The Army, in general, has one division specifically committed to the defense of Korea and one division in Hawaii which could be deployed to Korea. The previous plans to withdraw the 2nd Infantry Division from Korea have been cancelled. On the west coast of the United States are two infantry divisions, one with an organic National Guard brigade (ROUNDOUT brigade). There are in the Western U.S. also a separate mechanized infantry brigade, two Guard armored cavalry regiments and a mechanized infantry division, all of which could be deployed in Northeast Asia. Depending on events elsewhere, however, it is anticipated that only the separate mechanized infantry brigade would be available in the 1990s for deployment to Korea and that two separate infantry brigades from midwest states would join the Guard unit in Korea. It is also possible, and postulated as such in this study, that in the 1990s, only one U.S. Army division will be available for deployment in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific.

Because no ground combat mission would be conducted in the Pacific's western reaches and Northeast Asia without cooperation from U.S. allies, it is useful to consider their expected contribution to the defense of their own interests.

Japan contributes 11 divisions to the ground defense of the islands. Japan's primary concern is Hokkaido across from which the Soviets have established themselves in strength. The Japanese ground self-defense force is well equipped and armed, and well trained. The Japanese are unlikely to ask for U.S.



ground combat troops. On the other hand, U.S. Navy and Air Force counterparts would very likely join Japanese forces in the defense of the islands in the event of a high intensity attack.

South Korea has an army 600,000 strong with a large and well trained reserve. It will bear the brunt of any invasion by North Korea. It will, as opposed to Japan, rely on support from U.S. ground combat forces. Some of these U.S. forces are nuclear capable and as such act as a strong deterrent to invasion from the north. The South Korean navy is primarily a coast defense force, while the air force is charged with close air support and air defense tasks.

The Philippines have an army adequate to maintain the present government in power. It is engaged in counterinsurgency operations in which the United States would not get involved unless the U.S. bases are attacked. The Philippine air force and navy are too small to fight any external aggressor and would depend heavily on U.S. Air Force and Navy contributions.

The island states which the United States is committed to protect in the future require no permanent ground force presence, but if attacked would probably be defended by USMC units with naval and air force support.

We have dwelt at some length on the array of friendly assets available for contingencies in Northeast Asia to drive home the point that even under the most unfavorable scenario of conflict in that area, there would appear to be no convincing case for a numerical increase in Army manpower through 2000.

On the other hand, there is always a case for qualitative improvement in manpower skills at all levels to get the most out of increasingly complex and sophisticated weaponry and to understand and exploit the combat environment. The current, relatively stable military situation in Korea and the prospect of reasonable continuity in the Army presence there provide an opportunity for the fine tuning of the force to its conventional warfare mission and to improved coordination with other U.S. services and ROK forces. If it has not already been done, an assessment should be made of the specialized, higher level skills needed in Korea for such tasks as 1) monitoring and evaluating North Korean capabilities, tactics and intentions, 2) improving LOC's and communications, including electronic data communications, 3) enhancing lateral communication with ROK forces, 4) identifying and mobilizing civilian facilities for possible use in a crisis, etc. Once such needs have been determined, a program should be developed to move personnel with the critical MOS to Korea and possibly to acquire others through contracts with civilian agencies or private enterprise. Against a stronger and better armed adversary, such as the one we face today in Korea, our best hope lies in better manpower, better preparation, better coordination, and the best use of available technology.

But if our scenarios for the 1990s are correct and the North Koreans shift from a conventional threat to structured terrorism in the ROK, it will be necessary for the Army to put a new emphasis on in-country training programs for U.S. forces in Korea covering counter-terrorist techniques. Reaction to such attacks would, of course, devolve primarily to the ROK forces, but U.S.

forces will inevitably become involved and vulnerable U.S. installations may be deliberately targeted by the North Koreans.

Some of the other implications for Army planners arising from presumed changes in the PRK threat are discussed later in this paper.

### Technical Considerations

The technology paper in this study rules out the availability in the 1990s of a really new generation of Army hardware. It lists a few items already in the R & D pipeline which might be helpful if they prove out, but most of these were conceived for use in high intensity and vertically escalating conflict in Central Europe and would be of marginal utility, except as a part of the deterrence array, in combating the kind of hit-and-run guerrilla violence foreseen for Korea in our most likely scenario. Some improvement is promised in helicopters and mines, both of which would have application in Korea, but the conclusion is that our troops in Korea will be armed in the 1990s with essentially the same kind of equipment they have today.<sup>26</sup>

Still less encouraging is the fact that Soviet technology in this field may have advanced more rapidly than our own. They have more and better-educated technical personnel more focused on military applications. Whether this sophistication is transferable to the North Koreans - or will be transferred - remains to be seen, but we must assume that the North Koreans, whether operating in a conventional or commando mode, will be armed with the best Soviet weapons and ancillary equipment appropriate to their mission.

The upgrading of our deterrence array in Korea is discussed later in this paper. The Army should also consider, however, whether better technology can be found to help our Korean forces cope with the PRK guerrilla attacks that may be forthcoming.

To the extent that our needs lie in the dual-purpose area, e.g., vehicles, airlift, communications, and optical equipment,

there is doubtless private industry technology in being or on the drawing boards that is worthy of study -- and we need not feel constrained to American private industry. It would presumably be cheaper to acquire and adapt to Army use hardware already being manufactured in large quantities for the civilian market than to produce a military version from scratch. There is, of course, nothing new in this concept, but if Army Staff studies should reveal that our division in Korea is inadequately or unsuitably armed to meet an altered threat, there is ample justification for untraditional procurement techniques and external sourcing, at least on an interim basis.

As far as future Army R&D is concerned, the whole thrust of this paper headlines a need for lighter, more portable, and more versatile equipment suitable for use by foot-mobile light infantry forces operating far from their bases in small units without an assured supply chain. The adequacy of our present TE for security assistance-type missions should be critically reexamined, including everything from airlift to consumables. Key points will be the firepower/weight ratio, independence from higher echelon maintenance and resupply, and suitability for counter-insurgency combat in populated areas. The need for such equipment is not area-specific, but it will probably arise in Korea and possibly in Southeast Asia.

At the same time it would be imprudent to abandon R&D on systems geared to high intensity warfare with a risk of vertical escalation. Lead times are long and the brushfire war era we foresee for the 1990s may not last far into the next century.

Indeed, it may already be too late for R&D projects initiated now to greatly influence Army capabilities in the 1990s.

## Force Employment Characteristics

The Army Force Employment Characteristics paper in this study recommends that the focus of the reserve component divisions and brigades be narrowed to address solely the NATO mission, thereby freeing enough AD formations now committed to NATO to create a quick-light force of perhaps four division equivalents to meet low- to medium-intensity conflict contingencies elsewhere in the world during the 1990s. This recommendation is fully consistent with the main thrust of the entire study.

With specific reference to East Asia, the Force Employment paper calls for a force in Korea which "could raise the level of tactical violence to high intensity and sustain the south Koreans logistically."<sup>27</sup> For Southeast Asia, the paper foresees a need for Army security advisors and logistical sustainment elements but would leave direct military action in a contingency to the Air Force in the form of air strikes against the aggressor's heartland. It was argued that no vital U.S. interest in the region would justify to the American public a commitment of U.S. ground forces. Both of these proposals need to be put into the context of the author's intent and to be reconciled with the likely scenarios of conflict later developed.

With regard to Korea, the Force Employment paper was clearly focused on the credibility of our Korean force as a deterrent to a main force North Korean invasion of the South. In that context, the recommendation makes sense. Our Korean force must have a capability for vertical escalation which is sufficiently awesome to make the risks of such an attack unacceptable. Army

planners are better equipped than CSIS to determine what weapons systems, if any, might need to be added to the existing inventory to achieve the desired level of frightfulness.

We must also prepare our force in Korea, however, to cope with the kind of conflict situation which may actually arise if the North Koreans seek to finesse our deterrent by launching low-intensity terrorist attacks by commanders who might, for example, pose as South Korean dissidents. This would not require significant change in the structure or deployment of our force, but rather a greater training emphasis on counter-insurgency tactics, the issuance of specialized surveillance communications, and perimeter security devices of the sort referred to above, and a general raising of the level of troop sensitivity to the commando threat.

With regard to Southeast Asia, the Force Employment paper presumably has in mind the contingency of a Vietnamese invasion of Thailand. Throughout this study there is general agreement that U.S. intervention in such an event, if requested under the Manila Pact, would be limited to logistical support. This might entail the introduction of small administrative units in the Bangkok area but no fighting troops. Under our more bellicose Scenario 2, however, it is possible that low-intensity conflict will develop in the insular ASEAN states, most likely in the form of insurgency, which could be sufficiently threatening to U.S. vital interests or the safety of U.S. resident nationals to justify a short-duration, special operation by a seaborne, airborne, or air-mobile Army or Marine Corps unit. It is



believed that such an operation would be tolerated by American public opinion because it would not involve a protracted presence and would not be on the mainland of Asia.

For the Army to play this role, it would need a small, highly trained security assistance force somewhere in the region, perhaps as part of a larger army command. This could be placed at Clark Field. If we should lose the Philippines bases (Scenario 2) it could be based, for example, on Malaysian Borneo or in Western Australia. The existence of such a force would serve to improve the U.S./Soviet power balance in Southeast Asia, with helpful psychological effect throughout ASEAN. On the other hand, it would be expensive and might be perceived as duplicating a USMC capability already in place on Okinawa and at Subic Bay. Ultimately the decision will be predicated on the dynamics of conflict in the area, the degree of threat to U.S. vital interests (especially the straits) and conflicting budgetary and manpower priorities elsewhere. A decision by NATO, for example, or by a single NATO country, to permit RDJTF operations from Europe into Southwest Asia would probably reduce the military importance of the Straits to the U.S. and the priority of a U.S. force to protect them.

### Mobilization

It has been judged earlier in this paper that the strength of active duty U.S. forces in the Western Pacific is sufficient to cope with even high-intensity and vertically-escalating conflict in Korea. Thus such a conflict alone need not trigger mobilization.

If a decision is reached to create new active duty divisions for the conduct of RDF-type missions in the Third World, partial mobilization may be needed to fulfill our NATO commitment. However, this would have relevance to our strategy in East Asia only if one or more of these divisions were deployed in the region. This in turn would be justified only on the conditions outlined above under "manpower."

### Force Mobility

Force mobility is a topic of particular concern in East Asia, because of both the sheer dimensions of the region itself and its remoteness from CONUS. The distance from Seoul to Honolulu, for example, is about 4,000 miles and from Seoul to Sydney is 4,900. Between Manila and Diego Garcia there is a 3,800 mile-wide band of heavily populated, violence-prone countries devoid of U.S. Army presence. If we had a force at Subic Bay it would take two days to reach Djakarta by sea; from Pusan it would take upwards of four, and from Perth nearly three days.

In the event of a sudden heavy attack on South Korea from the north (perhaps 35 percent probability up to the year 2,000) at a time when at least one U.S. division is deployed there, there would be an immediate need for resupply to both U.S. and ROK forces. This would presumably be made initially by airlift from Hawaii, Guam, Okinawa, and/or the Philippines. The political feasibility of resupply from or via Japan will depend on the diplomatic climate prevailing at the time, but cannot be presumed. The introduction of additional U.S. divisions could presumably be accomplished by sea if 1) the North Korean Navy can be contained, and 2) ROK forces are holding well enough to keep ports secure. Neither of these conditions can be assumed. If the attack comes after U.S. forces have been withdrawn, their rapid redeployment would depend largely on the extent to which they left prepositioned equipment in Korea. Planning for all of these contingencies, including earmarking of suitable air and sealift, should be periodically updated.

If a quick reaction Army unit is forward-based somewhere in the ASEAN region, it should obviously be colocated with airlift appropriate in size, range, and configuration for the potential mission. This probably implies fixed-wing aircraft. For a typical security assistance mission of short duration, the mobility assessed requirement should be manageable.

### Employment in a Wide Spectrum of Conflict

East Asia has the potential for the full spectrum of violence, from a globe-threatening nuclear holocaust to minor terrorism. The United States, China, and the U.S.S.R. are all nuclear powers, though China's intercontinental delivery capability is questionable. Six of the top conventional military powers in the world (the U.S.S.R., the U.S., Vietnam, China, North Korea, and South Korea) are all present in the region. There are more than one million troops concentrated within 100 miles of the Sino-Soviet border. A hot conventional war is currently in progress in Kampuchea. Except for Singapore, every country in the region between the Tropics of Cancer and Capricorn suffers from endemic insurgency. Piracy is rampant in the Southeast Asian straits. Territorial disputes involving major military powers abound from Sakhalin to the Sprailys.

Much of this violence, however, is irrelevant to vital or important U.S. interests and therefore does not call for a U.S. military response. A race riot in Surabaya, for example, is a priori an Indonesian affair. If it should threaten American lives and property, our Consul General there would expect the Indonesian Police to provide security. If things got really hairy, the Seventh Fleet might position a frigate in the Bali Sea. But only if the Indonesian authorities told us that they could no longer guarantee our safety would we contemplate an operation on the ground. Under current circumstances it would probably be a USMC operation. Its mission would be to evacuate the Americans, not to put down the rioting.

On the other hand, if an Indonesian communist guerrilla force should seize northern Sumatra and announce that the Straits of Malacca were thenceforth closed to all but Soviet and Vietnamese shipping, we would almost certainly be eager to assist the Indonesian government in defeating the insurgents. The rub is that this would require a U.S. Army expeditionary force which, in our present situation, would probably have to be airlifted all the way from CONUS. Under the circumstances, we and the Indonesians would probably turn instead to an ASEAN neighbor, such as Malaysia, and provide air or sealift for an appropriate force from that country.

If the Vietnamese should seize American off-shore drilling rigs in the Gulf of Tonkin, we might send a carrier Task force, but if the PRC should do the attacking we would be more likely to call in their ambassador. Every case is ad hoc and sui generis and any use of U.S. force in the region would probably require a specific presidential decision. The point is that if U.S. vital interests are threatened by violence in East Asia in any locale other than South Korea, there could not today be a rapid U.S. Army response. Ninety percent of the time, host country forces, assisted by their allies and perhaps the U.S. Navy and Air Force, could contain a medium intensity internal insurgency or external attack, but there are conceivable contingencies in our Scenario 2 in which a properly equipped and trained U.S. Army force could spell the difference between victory and defeat.

The kind of U.S. Army force potentially needed in Southeast Asia is perhaps a light infantry division, colocated with adequate U.S.-controlled airlift and sealift assets, trained and

equipped for operations in the tropics against both irregular and conventional forces, and capable of operating either as a division strength expeditionary force, or in smaller security assistance detachments down to company size. Ideally it should be based in the heart of Southeast Asia, e.g., Sarawak or Sumatra, where it would be nearer to likely contingencies and could be appropriately trained and acclimatized. If that should prove unfeasible for political or other reasons (Indonesia and Malaysia are not, after all, military allies of the United States), they could function from the Philippines or Western Australia.

It is not suggested that such a force be considered for early deployment. Our most likely scenario does not foresee contingencies in the area which would justify it. But this should be a part of the Army's contingency planning for activation if and when there is a marked deterioration in Southeast Asian political stability or in the U.S./Soviet power balance in the region, which in turn poses a clear threat to vital U.S. interests. If the United States were forced to abandon its Philippine bases and relocate elsewhere, e.g., to Australia, the inclusion of an Army force in the new base complex might also be considered.

The existing U.S. Army force in South Korea appears appropriate for its mission, which is essentially one of deterrence. We have already alluded, however, to the possible need for 1) upgrading the credibility of its vertical escalation capability, and 2) providing equipment and training for unit and base defense against North Korean terrorist attacks probes.



### Overflight Rights and Forward Basing

Except in the contingency defined in the preceding section, there would appear to be no justification for new Army bases in East Asia or the Western Pacific. The JCS will, however, be required to assign responsibility for defenses of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Army planners should consider whether Army participation in that mission might serve as a useful opportunity for the training of quick-light airmobile units in joint operations. On the other hand, the defensive mission per se is probably more appropriate for the Navy and Marines.

If there are to be no new Army bases, there is presumably no need for new air movement rights agreements. Since such agreements are classified, CSIS cannot usefully address the adequacy of existing arrangements.

### Prepositioning

There would appear to be no justification for prepositioning in East Asia. Most of the units earmarked for a high-intensity warfare contingency in Korea are already forward-based, and that contingency -- unlikely in itself -- would not necessarily require an additional Army presence.

As and when existing Army forces in Korea are withdrawn, however, there is an excellent case for leaving some of their heavier weapons systems and troop-lift equipment behind in POMCUS style depots. This would permit their more rapid return in a crisis, with substantial airlift savings. Alternatively, the equipment would be available for ROK use in a lower-intensity conflict not requiring a U.S. Army redeployment.

## Force Design

The mission of the 2nd Division in Korea is comparable in most respects to that of our NATO divisions. It is to deter a high-intensity attack by a well-equipped modern conventional Army, which may conceivably be equipped with Soviet battlefield nuclear weapons. The likelihood of high-intensity conflict is somewhat greater in Korea than in Central Europe because it would not necessarily precipitate a superpower confrontation and World War III. If such an attack should be launched, escalation to the BNW level is a distinct possibility.

This is a situation in which the quality, sophistication, and lethality of the U.S. deterrent is the most decisive inhibition on Soviet and North Korean adventurism. There should be constant and well-advertised improvement in the force as new technology and doctrine, including C I systems, come on stream. This is a theater in which the Army should put its best foot forward, because erosion in our deterrence will invite PRK attack while they still retain numerical and qualitative superiority over ROK forces. Our Korean force (and the ROK forces as well) should clearly have a credible defense against a BW/CW attack.

## STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS FOR THE ARMY

A strategy seeks to answer the question "How, within a specified timeframe, do we get from A to B using C?" If A is the status quo, B is some new and better "status quo" and C is the resources predictably available to finance the transition, then the United States does not have a strategy in the field of national defense. This is because there is no agreed definition of B and no way to quantify C.

But resources flow and planners must plan how best to employ them and how to make a credible case for more. Thus the planner must finesse the politician and find values for B and C.

To start with B, where do the American people wish to be, geopolitically, in the year 2000? The founding fathers, 200 years ago, laid down the ideal of "liberty and justice for all" and few Americans would quarrel with that ideal today. But in the dangerous and disillusioned world of 1982 an ideal is not something you plan for; it is something you pray for. Few Americans today are willing to pay the price for world liberation, because the price would be total war, and total war would kill more people than it would liberate. Few Americans are willing to risk total war to bring the complex blessings of freedom to places like Eastern Europe, Cuba, Vietnam, or North Korea, let alone to the Soviet Union itself. To most Americans a realistic goal for the balance of this century would be "keep the peace and sauve qui peut"; in other words, maintain the status quo without conflict. Thus B equals A, and the strategic challenge can be rephrased to ask "How can we stay at A, using

C?" This study therefore assumes that peaceful containment is the goal of our defense strategy for the 1990s.

Factor C -- resources predictably available for defense -- is not a given. Defense budgets are the product of popular moods, public perceptions of threat, competing priorities, and fiscal liquidity. American history amply demonstrates that political leadership can exert only the most marginal influence on defense budget levels. Administrations whose defense goals, whether for expansion or retrenchment, are out of synch with popular moods and perceptions will not attain their goals. This study concludes that in global terms the popular American mood for a stronger defense is relatively low in 1982 but is on the rise, and the threat perception is somewhat higher and also rising. Thus, if our adversaries continue along their present expansionist course, it is reasonable to assume that the money allocated by the body politic to the nation's defense will rise significantly into the 1990s, though probably not at the optimum rate because of competing priorities and persisting fiscal illiquidity.

If we assume that the defense budget pie will be somewhat larger in the 1990s, the Army planner will need to make further assumptions about its apportionment among the services and within each service by geographical region. Since our global goal is peaceful containment, these decisions will depend on the nature of conflict which threatens (i.e., whether it will be land, sea, or air oriented), its most likely locale, and the extent to which vital U.S. interests are on the line in the zone of violence. A policy of peaceful containment inevitably leaves the initiative

to the adversary. His objectives, his strategy and his capabilities will be the chief determinants of both the nature and locale of violence. We can influence his agenda only by the nature and credibility of our deterring forces in each region. Since our resources will be inadequate to smother all violence everywhere, we must focus them primarily in the areas where our most vital interests are engaged and where the adversary's most vital targets are located. This entails a calculated risk that in the face of our concentrated deterrence the foe will not alter his agenda and strike where we are weakest. He also has no preconceived timetable. His fundamental objective is to preserve his own political system by keeping us off balance, in disarray, and on the defensive. Our study concludes that World War III is not on the Soviet agenda for the 1990s. His probes and provocations will probably be low in intensity and he will work through proxies where he can. He will not wish to risk vertical escalation. Thus we cannot rely on the strategic nuclear deterrent to keep the peace in any region, with the possible exception of Central Europe.

What does all this imply for the Army's strategy in East Asia and the Western Pacific? In comparison with other regions, how vital are our interests there? How high is that region on the Soviet hit list? How likely is it that violence in that region will require an Army, rather than a Navy or Air Force, response? To what extent can our friends and allies in the region contain Soviet and Soviet-proxy provocations without enjoining U.S. military intervention? It is the answers to these

questions, all of which have been addressed in this paper, which must underlie the Army's strategy in East Asia.

In the briefest possible fashion, therefore, our answers to these questions are as follows:

- o Our vital interests in East Asia are mainly logistical and economic. Our sea lanes and air routes there are essential to our global military reach and the raw materials and markets of the region are important to the West, but particularly to our Japanese ally. If large parts of the region should come under Soviet control, Japan and China could be economically isolated and politically neutralized; and we would be severely constrained in our military access to Southwest Asia from the east. Our own western approaches and our pacific islands would be threatened. It would appear that only Western Europe and Southwest Asia are of greater strategic importance to the United States at this point in history.
- o Soviet intentions in the region are clearly expansionist. They have greatly strengthened their naval presence in the Western Pacific and have devoted vast resources to improving the military capability of their two powerful proxies, North Korea and Vietnam. They want to encircle China and thereby to neutralize what they perceive as a dangerous military and ideological threat from that quarter. To a lesser extent they would like to reduce U.S. influence in, and

access to and through, the region. Yet it is more than arguable that Soviet ambitions in the region will exceed their capabilities in the 1990s. They have not achieved a general power balance in the region, their proxies are under severe economic strain, and their foes, including China, are gaining in relative strength and stability. The Soviets probably consider the break-up of NATO and the interdiction of Middle East oil to be higher priority objectives.

- o The Army role in the peaceful containment of Soviet and Soviet proxy aggression in East Asia is obviously predominant in Korea and should remain so through 2000. There would appear to be no Army role in the China/Taiwan situation and at best a marginal Army role in Southeast Asian peacekeeping. On the other hand, a modest Army presence in Southeast Asia would strengthen our deterrent posture there and build ASEAN confidence.
- o Friendly defensive strength in the region is clearly on the rise. China, South Korea, and the ASEAN countries are actively engaged in force improvement and Japan seems on the verge of a heftier defense budget. ROF forces appear capable of containing all but a high-intensity attack from the North and the ASEAN countries should be able to handle the low level insurgency pressures foreseen in our most likely scenario. The latter might, however, need some U.S. Army help, at least of a logistical nature, if more persistent



Soviet/Vietnamese pressures build up, as in our Scenario 2.

This leads to the following conclusions of this study with reference to the East Asia/Western Pacific region:

1. The North Koreans are unlikely to launch a high-intensity attack on South Korea provided the United States conventional and nuclear deterrent force remains in place until supplanted by an equally credible ROK deterrent. However, the likelihood of such an attack is clearly a function of the credibility of the U.S. deterrent. This should be upgraded constantly as new technology comes on stream and to the extent that the armistice agreement permits.

2. The North Koreans may launch low-intensity terrorist attacks in the South to create confusion and bring down the government there, particularly if the United States force is prematurely reduced or removed. Although ROK forces will have primary containment responsibility, U.S. forces should be trained and equipped for this contingency.

3. It is probable that Japan will soon increase its defense budget in terms of percent of GNP. This could lead incidentally to the emergence of Japan as a major defense equipment supplier. It may also enable Japan to play a larger role in regional defense.

4. The Sino/Soviet and Sino/Vietnamese confrontations will probably continue into the 1990s, with sporadic border conflict of low intensity. This will have an inhibiting influence on Soviet/Vietnamese adventurism in the region.

5. There is a reasonable prospect for a nonviolent resolution of the China/Taiwan conflict. In any event, there is little likelihood of U.S. military involvement in that conflict.

6. Our Philippine base agreements will be renewed on acceptable terms, but the physical security of those bases will be under intermittent threat from communist insurgents. An expanded U.S. Army role in base security may become necessary.

7. South Vietnam will continue to seek unchallenged political and military control of Laos and Kampuchea, to which Hanoi considers itself historically entitled, and will try to destabilize Thailand by military and/or subversive pressure in order to discourage further Thai aid to non-communist insurgents in Kampuchea.

8. Chinese proxy pressure on Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea and Laos will continue to increase, thus reducing the Vietnamese threat to Thailand. If the Vietnamese should attack Thailand, U.S. Army involvement will be limited to logistical support. The Army should have a contingency plan to provide it.

9. Despite a likely improvement in the economic health and military capability of the ASEAN countries, low-intensity insurgency will remain an endemic problem. The insertion of a modest U.S. Army quick-light reaction capability into the area could contribute to the deterrence and containment of such violence. The Army should design a force for such a purpose with the optimum mix of mobility and firepower and start thinking now about where it might be based, if and when the threat to our vital interests begins to appear more menacing.

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


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10. Australian/New Zealand military capabilities will probably be marginally stronger in the 1990s, thereby contributing to Southeast Asian security and stability.

11. U.S. security commitments to the Pacific island states and dependencies will most likely be met by the Navy and Air Force, but a small Army presence may prove desirable.

12. Under the most likely scenario, the U.S. Army presence in East Asia will be smaller in 2000 than it is today.

## NOTES

1. In 1979 Japan imported about 86 percent of its total energy needs. Of total needs, domestic sources supplies only 0.2 percent of oil, 11 percent of natural gas, 23 percent of coal, 5.5 percent of hydroelectric and geothermal, 4.6 percent of nuclear. Overall 70 percent of Japan's energy needs are met by oil, 98 percent of which is imported. Japan and the Oil Program (Tokyo: The committee for Energy Policy Promotion, October, 1981).

Imports of raw and fuel materials including crude oil and iron ore surpassed \$90 billion accounting for over 65 percent of Japan's total imports. Raw energy imports equalled 61 percent and crude and raw oil imports totalled \$52 billion or 40 percent of total imports. Japan Economic Journal, Industrial Review of Japan/1981, Tokyo, p. 33.

2. In 1979, Japan's direct foreign investments broke down as follows: 28.8 percent in North America; 24.2 percent in Latin America; 19.5 percent in Asia; 2.6 percent in the Middle East; 9.9 percent in Europe; 3.4 percent in Africa; 11.6 percent in Oceania. Industrial Review of Japan, p. 38. In 1980 Direct Foreign Investments totalled 36 billion dollars. Throughout the 1980s they will continue to grow in overall terms. Throughout the 1980s they will continue to grow in overall terms. Commercial investments are expected to decrease while manufacturing and natural resource investments will climb. "Forecast for the 1980s" (Tokyo: Japan Economic Research Center, 1980).

3. For recent studies of the U.S.-Japan economic relationship see U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Trade of the Ways and Means Committee, U.S.-Japan Trade Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), September 5, 1980, Report of the Japan-U.S. Economic Relations Group, January, 1981 and Supplemental Report of the Japan-U.S. Economic Relations Group, (Washington, D.C.: The Japan-U.S. Economic Relations Group), October 1981, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Subcommittee on Trade of the Ways and Means Committee. Report on Trade Mission to the Far East (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), December 1981, Yearbook of U.S.-Japan Economic Relations in 1980 (Washington, D.C.: Japan Economic Institute), 1981 and General Accounting Office, U.S.-Japan Trade: Issues and Problems, September 21, 1979.

4. In 1981, defense R & D comprised only 1 percent of the defense budget of \$9.5 billion. Keidanren is lobbying to increase it to 2 percent. In the United States, ten percent of the defense budget goes for R & D, twelve percent in Great Britain, five percent in West Germany, and 20-30 percent in the Soviet Union. The rest of the budget was divided as follow: 49.3 for personnel provisions, 20.7 percent for equipment purchases, 14.1 percent for maintenance, 10.4 percent for base countermeasures, 2.8 percent for facilities and installations, and 1.8 percent for miscellaneous expenses. See Defense of Japan, 1980, p. 283, and "Time for a technology transfer in reverse - Industrial Japan 1981," Far Eastern Economic Review, p. 76-77.

5. For an expanded discussion of the strategic significance of the Korean peninsula, see Seung Hwan Kim, Bear in the Land of Morning Calm: Soviet Policy Toward North Korea, 1964-1968. Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgetown University, 1980.

6. "Omura Pinpoints Hikes in North Korean Military Power," The Korea Herald (Seoul), July 29, 1981. See also: The Military Balance 1981-1982, (IISS), pp. 82-84.

7. Robert A. Scalapino, "Current Dynamics of the Korean Peninsula," Problems of Communism, Vol. XXX. November-December, 1981, pp. 16-31.

8. For such an implication, see "Japan Weighs More Aid to Its Korean 'Defense Shield,'" Christian Science Monitor, January 5, 1982.

9. Seung Hwan Kim, "Conflicting Strategic Interests in Northeast Asia," Northeast Asia: Prosperity and Vulnerability, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown CSIS, 1979.

10. "R.O.K. To Promote Relations with Communist Nations," FBIS, Daily Report, Asia & Pacific, October 28, 1981, p. E3. Also, "Deputy Premier Sees Need to Plan for PRC Trade," FBIS, Daily Report, Asia & Pacific, pp. E1-E2.

11. For a further explanation, see Young C. Kim, "North Korea in 1980: The Son Also Rises," Asian Survey, Vol. XXI, January 1981, pp. 112-124.

12. Scalapino, "Current Dynamics of the Korean Peninsula," Kyong Hyang Sinmun (Seoul), October 26, 1981.

13. Asia 1982 Yearbook, p. 185.



14. The Global 2000 Report to the President: Entering the Twenty-First Century. A Report Prepared by the Council on Environmental Quality and the Department of State. Volume I. Washington, D.C.

15. "Let Us Vigorously Push Ahead With the Initial Battles of the New Year in All Sectors and Units," Nodong Shinmun (Pyongyang), January 3, 1982. "Kim Il-song Presides At Fourth KWP Plenum," FBIS, Daily Report, Asia & Pacific, October 8, 1981, pp. D2-D10.

16. Asia 1982 Yearbook, p. 180.

17. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook -- 1981 (Washington, D.C., 1981), p. 107.

18. Hu Yaobang, speech celebrating the 60th Anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China, 1 July 1981, text in Beijing Review, 13 July 1981, p. 24.

19. Paul Dibb, in "China's Strategic Situation and Defense Priorities in the 1980s," Australian Journal of China Affairs, cites China's concept of "people's war under modern conditions" which, among other things, places heavy emphasis on the concepts of active defense, flexibility, and mobile warfare.

20. For more detail concerning the modernization efforts of China's various forces, see: Far Eastern Economic Review, October 2, 1981, pp. 10-12; December 18, 1981, pp. 26-29.

21. For a discussion of Taiwan's domestic political outlook for the 1980s, see One Year After.

22. Amendment of the 1947 U.S.-Philippines Military Bases Agreement, U.S. State Department Factsheet, Washington, D.C., January 1979;

Arrangements Regarding Delineation of United States Facilities at Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base; Powers and Responsibilities fo the Philippines Base Commanders and Related Powers and Responsibilities of the United States Facility Commanders; and the Tabones Training Complex;

Exchange of Notes Amending the Philippines-U.S. Military Bases Agreement of 1947, Manila, 7 January 1979, p. 2.

23. Statement of Agreed Principles for Free Association, Hilo, Hawaii, April 9, 1978;

For greater detail on the agreed principles, see:

Compact of Free Association, October 31, 1980;

Memorandum of Understanding of the Government of the United States and the Government of the Federated States of Micronesia, with respect to Meanings and Terms and Expressins used in Section 314 of the Compact of Free Association, October 31, 1980;

Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Federated States of Micronesia Regarding Aspects of the Marine Sovereignty and Jurisdiction of the Federated States of Micronesia, October 31, 1980;

Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of Palau regarding Radioactive, Chemical and Biological Substances, November 17, 1980;

Agreement Regarding the Jurisdiction and Sovereignty of the Republic of Palau over its Territory and the Living and Non-Living Resources of the Sea, November 17, 1980.

24. See Henry Kamm, "Striking Similarities to Situation in Iran Causing Concern to Indonesian Regime," The New York Times, 4 June 1979, p. 3.

25. Stephen A. Hildreth, A Projection of American "Moods".

26. David Williamson Jr. Some Technological Implications for the Army's Arms of the Future, pp. 8-9.

27. William C. Louisell, Army Force Employment Characteristics for the 1990s, pp. 6-7.

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